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MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS OF TRAIT
CATEGORIES AND THEIR INFLUENCES ON
PERSON PERCEPTION
WILLIAM FLEESON
Max Planck Institute, Berlin, Germany
SABRINAZIRKEL
Saybrook Institute, San Francisco, California
EDWARD E. SMITH
University ofMichigan at Ann Arbor
Three studies explored mental representations of the organization of acts into traits,
and how such mental representations influence person perception. Specifically,
we investigated whether acts vary in their degree of trait-category membership
(prototypicality), what determines an act's prototypicality, and whether acts'
prototypicalities influence conclusions about observed acts. By drawing on re
search on prototypicality-based models of mental representations (Osherson,
Smith, Wilkie, L6pez, & Shafir, 1990), five hypotheses were proposed about the
nature of mental representations of traits and how they influence person percep
tion. In Study 1, subjects rated three aspects of several acts: how prototypical of
the trait they are, how similar they are to other acts in the trait, and how extreme
they are. Subjects showed substantial agreement on all three ratings. Additionally,
an act's similarity to other acts in the trait was predictive of how prototypical the
act was, but the act's extremity was a stronger predictor of its prototypicality. Study
2 investigated how the prototypicality of an actor's observed acts influences person
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perception. Subjects were more willing to describe an actor's acts with a trait when
the acts were prototypical or similar to each other than when the acts were not
prototypical or not similar to each other. Study 3 investigated the prototypicality
of predicted acts. Results showed that predictions of acts were not influenced by
the prototypicality of the predicted acts. Together, the three studies suggest that
mental representations of traits are consensual and that they influence person
perception.
A great deal of research has explored how individuals use trait terms on
the basis of observing others' behavior (for reviews, seeHiggins & Bargh,
1987; Jones, 1990; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Much less of this research has
investigated how mental representations of act-trait relations influence
such uses of trait terms, despite the fact that person-perception processes
almost certainly draw on perceivers' stored knowledge about traits and
acts. That is, in order for perceivers to be able to apply trait terms on the
basis of observing behavior, perceivers must have some idea of what a
trait is and how individual acts relate to a trait.
One way perceivers might represent traits is as hierarchically struc
tured categories, with acts as low-level (subordinate) categories, and
traits as higher level (superordinate) categories (Barsalou, 1985;
Borkenau, 1990; Buss & Craik, 1983; Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Read,
Jones, & Miller, 1990). For example, aloofness might be a category of
act-categories like "standing apart from others at a party," and "pre
tending not to see a friend on the street." Furthermore, a trait category
might not be a simple, unorganized list of act-categories, but rather have
an internal structure, so that acts within a trait category differ in their
degree of "belongingness" to the category. For example, "offering a
monosyllabic response to a conversational overture" might be stored as
a better example of aloofness than is "sitting at home and reading a
book," although both acts could be called aloof. If so, then person
perception might be influenced by this structure, for example, by the
degree of belongingness of observed acts to a given trait category
(Barsalou, 1985; Borkenau, 1990; Buss & Craik, 1983; Read et al., 1990).
In other words, traits are more than just the end products of impres
sions, but are knowledge structures that influence the impression-for
mation process itself. The point of the present research is two-fold: (i)
describe the internal structure of trait categories; and (ii) determine
whether and how the internal structure influences person perception.
Research on mental representations of natural objects (e.g., birds and
mammals) has produced a solid understanding of the structure of men
tal representations of such natural objects. We can draw analogies to this
research as a source of predictions about categories of traits. In addition
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to clarifying the lay theory of traits, such an approach might describe
new constraints on person perception (Borkenau, 1990; Cantor & Mis-
chel, 1977; Cantor, Mischel, & Schwartz, 1982; Jones, 1993; Read et al.,
1990; Trope & Higgins, 1993). In this introduction, we (i) describe five
principles that characterize mental representations of natural objects,
and their influences on reasoning about natural objects, (ii) analogize five
hypotheses for the trait domain, and (iii) describe some possible chal
lenges to those hypotheses. The research we report examines to what
extent these analogized hypotheses hold, and in the process helps clarify
both person-perception processes and the lay theory of traits.
FAMILY RESEMBLANCE AND NATURAL-OBJECT CATEGORIES
Starting with the premise that people mentally organize natural objects
into categories, much progress has been made in describing the proper
ties of this organization and its influences on inferential reasoning
(Medin, 1989; Shipley, 1993). We have selected five principles that we
believe cover several of the major findings of the existing research (based
on Osherson et al., 1990), and that result in interesting predictions for
person perception. This research could be described with alternative
organizations, and we do not intend this particular organization as a
comprehensive review.
The domain that this research covers is natural objects that are organ
ized into hierarchical categories. Natural objects are psychologically
simple categories like birds, mammals, and furniture, and hierarchies
are defined by asymmetrical class inclusion. That is, categories can be
seen as distributed across levels; lower-level (subordinate) categories are
included within higher-level (superordinate) categories, but do not ex
haust the superordinate categories. This condition is expressed by the
fact that a lower-level category can be said to be "a kind of" its superor
dinate category, but the superordinate category is not "a kind of" the
subordinate category. For example, "sparrows" are a kind of "bird", but
"birds" are not a kind of "sparrow". Thus, "sparrows" is a subordinate
category of the superordinate "bird" category. The following principles
apply to such hierarchical categories of natural objects.
The first two principles describe the organization of subordinate cate
gories into superordinate categories. An impetus for this research
was
the insight to eschew the classic notion of categories as defined by
necessary and sufficient features,
in which subordinates either belong or
do not belong to a given superordinate. Rosch and Mervis (1975) estab
lished the first principle, that category membership is a matter of degree.
For
example, both sparrows and ostriches are birds, although most of
us
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would agree that sparrows are better examples of birds than are os
triches. To demonstrate that people mentally represent categories with
such a graded membership, or "prototypicality" structure, a number of
experiments have shown that individuals agree in the prototypicality of
a wide variety of subordinates (e.g., Smith & Medin, 1981; cf. Margolis,
1994).
What determines a subordinate's prototypicality for its superordinate
category? Researchers theorized that feature-sharing organizes categories.
Categories vary in their features (e.g., Robins are (i) small, (ii) red, (iii)
winged, etc.), and themore features a category shareswith other categories
in the superordinate category, the more prototypical the category is of that
superordinate. When subjects rate the similarity of all pairings of subordi
nate categories belonging to the same superordinate category, the second
principle emerges: a subordinate's average pairzvise similarity (APS), across all
pairings, strongly predicts its prototypicality rating (Rosch, 1978; Smith &
Medin, 1981). Sparrows are prototypical birds because they share many
featureswith many other birds. This emphasis on variation in features and
in feature-sharing was central to subsequent investigations.
Subsequent research has shown that inferential reasoning about natu
ral-object categories is grounded in the structure of the mental repre
sentations (Osherson et al., 1990; Rips, 1975). Osherson and colleagues
focused on two kinds of argument that involve hierarchical categories.
The first kind of argument is known as "general", in which subjects are
told that some subordinate categories were observed to be described by
a certain predicate, and then are asked to indicate their confidence in
concluding that the superordinate category is also described by the
predicate. For example:
A. Observed: Sparrows have sesamoid bones.
Conclusion: Birds have sesamoid bones.
Here, sparrows is the subordinate category, birds is the superordinate
category, and "have sesamoid bones" is the predicate. Importantly, such
arguments are inductive, not deductive, because the conclusion is never
guaranteed. Rather, such conclusions are accepted with more or less
confidence, and the degree of confidence a particular argument inspires
is known as its strength. Whereas Argument (A) may be relatively
strong, knowing that ostriches have sesamoid bones does not provide
much confidence in the conclusion that birds have sesamoid bones (and
neither argument is perfectly strong). The next two principles concern
how category-structural properties of the observed category affect argu
ment strength.
The third principle is that the prototypicality of the observed category
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increases argument strength (Osherson et al., 1990). Subjects are more
willing to generalize to a superordinate category (e.g., birds) if the
category observed to be described by the predicate is prototypical of the
superordinate category (e.g., sparrows) than if it is not prototypical (e.g.,
ostriches). That is, if the observed subordinate is representative of the
superordinate, it seems plausible that the predicate applies to the su
perordinate as well.
What happens wheremore than one subordinate category is described
by the predicate?
B. Observed: Robins have sesamoid bones.
Bluejays have sesamoid bones.
Conclusion: Birds have sesamoid bones.
C. Observed: Hawks have sesamoid bones.
Sparrows have sesamoid bones.
Conclusion: Birds have sesamoid bones.
Just as in the case of a single observed subordinate, the crucial issue is
the representativeness of the set of observed subordinates. Because the
representativeness of the set increases with the representativeness of
each of the individual observed categories, the average prototypicality
of the observed categories remains effective in argument strength. How
ever, the representativeness of the set also increases with the dissimilar
ity among the observed categories. Holding prototypicality constant, the
more the categories in the observed set are dissimilar to each other, the
more of the other categories in the superordinate to which they will be
similar, so the more the observed categories will represent the other
categories in the superordinate. Example (C) is strong because more
birds are similar to either hawks or sparrows than are similar to either
robins or bluejays. Thus, thefourth principle is that, other things being equal,
argument strength increases with dissimilarity among the observed categories.
Note that the fourth principle is essentially an extension of the third
principle, under the assumption that prototypicality (repre
sentativeness) is determined by similarity.
In the second kind of argument ("specific"), the conclusion concerns
other subordinate categories rather than a superordinate category. For
example:
1. A more precise statement
is that argument strength is a function of the average of the
maximums of the similarity of each unobserved instance to each of the observed instances,
across all unobserved instances. However, dissimilarity and the above maximum function
are close enough to allow conflation for expository purposes.
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D. Observed: Eagles have sesamoid bones.
Conclusion: Robins have sesamoid bones.
E. Observed: Eagles have sesamoid bones.
Conclusion: Pelicans have sesamoid bones.
In such arguments, both the observed and the conclusion categories
are at the same level and are included in the same superordinate, and it
is concluded that the same predicate that describes the observed cate
gory describes the conclusion category. Principle 3 still applies: the more
representative the observed category of the common superordinate
category, the greater the confidence in the conclusion. One might expect
that the prototypicality of the conclusion category would also influence
argument strength: more representative categories would seem more
likely to take on predicates of other categories in the same superordinate.
However, Rips (1975) was surprised to discover the fifth principle, that
argument strength is not affected by the prototypicality of the conclusion
category. If the observed category warrants an inference, the inference
covers all subordinates in the superordinate equally. Examples (D) and
(E) have similar inferential strength, even though robins are more pro
totypical than pelicans. In other words, despite the fact that the proto
typicality of an observed category greatly affects inferences, such
inferences apply equally well to conclusion categories of all levels of
prototypicality, provided they are included in the same superordinate
(Osherson et al., 1990; Rips, 1975).
FAMILY RESEMBLANCE AND TRAIT CATEGORIES
Buss and Craik (1983; 1984) merged family-resemblance theories of
categories with summary-labels theories of traits to propose a new
approach to personality: the act-frequency approach. One common defi
nition of traits is as "summary labels" (e.g., Alston, 1975; Borkenau &
Muller, 1992; Buss & Craik, 1983; Hampshire, 1953; John, 1990; Newman
& Uleman, 1993). There are two key aspects of such a definition. First,
trait terms are organized in hierarchies. At the higher levels are catego
ries like "interpersonal traits", next lower levels would include broad
traits like "extraversion" or "neuroticism", one level down is composed
of narrower traits (e.g., under "extraversion" might be "talkative", "ac
tive", "dominant", etc.), still lowerwould be act categories (e.g., "starting
a conversation with a stranger"), and at the very bottom would be
specific acts (Buss & Craik, 1983; Eysenck, 1947; Hampson, John, &
Goldberg, 1986; John, Hampson, & Goldberg, 1991;McCrae & John, 1992;
Wiggins, 1979). Note that people do not appear in this hierarchy; only
behaviors and traits appear (cf., Anderson & Sedikides, 1991; Bassili,
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1989; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Sedikides & Anderson, 1994). However, the
second aspect of the summary-labels definition of traits is that these
categories are useful for describing people's behavior at various levels
of abstraction. The higher the level the category, the more abstract the
description, but the description is of the person's behavior. For example,
behavior can be described at the act-category level (e.g., "slamming the
door upon leaving the room is what he did") or more abstractly at the
trait level (e.g., "acting quarrelsome is what he did"). That is, traits are
labels for summarizing a person's behavior: saying someone has a trait
is nothing more than saying that a good general description of the
person's behavior is that trait term (Alston, 1975; Buss & Craik, 1983;
Hampshire, 1953; John, 1990; Newman & Uleman, 1993).
Adding the notion of family-resemblance to summary-labels models
of traits, Buss and Craik (1983) suggested that some act-categories are
better examples of their superordinate trait than are other act-categories.
As a test of this claim, they had subjects rate the prototypicality (how
good of an example of the trait the act is) of several acts, and found strong
agreement in subjects' ratings, suggesting that it was a meaningful task.
Borkenau (1990) replicated this finding, and Hampson (1982) provided
additional evidence.
However, unlike for natural-object categories, we do not know yet (i)
what determines the prototypicality of an act category; or (ii) whether
and how the prototypicality structure influences person perception. The
five principles described above provide a good starting point for exam
ining these two issues, and the Osherson and colleagues (1990) model is
a detailed and elaborate theory that applies to hierarchical categories that
have a prototypicality structure. Most importantly, when analogies are
drawn from the five principles described above, five hypotheses emerge
that are interesting in their own right and that extend the Buss and Craik
model. The left column of Table 1 reviews the five principles described
above. The middle column, as will be described below, describes analo
gies of these five principles into five hypotheses for the trait domain. The
rightmost column, also as to be described, summarizes some possible
objections to the five hypotheses.
The first hypothesis states that membership in a category is a matter
of degree. This hypothesis has received empirical support (Borkenau,
1990; Buss & Craik, 1983; Hampson, 1982), and our goal is to replicate
this finding.
Hypothesis 2 concerns the determinants of an act's prototypicality
for
its superordinate trait category.
In the hierarchical structure of natural-
object categories, a subordinate category is considered
a good and
representative member
of its superordinate category (i.e., is highly
prototypical) to the extent that it is similar to other subordinate catego-
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TABLE 1. Summary of Five Hypotheses Analogized from the Natural-Object
Domain to Describe Mental Representations of Trait Categories and






1. Degree of membership





















1. An act's degree of
membership in a trait
category is a continuous
variable
2. Act prototypicality is
determined by the act's
average similarity to other
















Traits represent ideals, so
act prototypicality might
be determined by its
extremity




If traits are dimensional,
perceivers may predict
acts only of a certain level
of prototypicality
ries in the same superordinate. The analogy would be that an act
category (e.g., "slammed the door when he left the room") is a good and
representative member of its superordinate trait category (i.e., is highly
prototypical) to the extent that it is similar to other behaviors in the same
trait. This hypothesis has been challenged, however, on distinctions
among types of categories. Barsalou (1985) suggested that the purpose
of some categories, rather than simply collecting similar subordinates,
is to organize and rank means to accomplish a goal. For example,
"winter clothes" is not simply a collection of similar textiles, but rather
a set of subordinates that are each means to keep one warm. Thus, the
relevant dimension for determining a subordinate's prototypicality
(e.g., how good an example the subordinate is of "winter clothes"),
might be how well the subordinate facilitates the goal. In other words,
the subordinate's approximation to ideal facilitation, or its extremity, not
its similarity to other subordinates. Borkenau (1990) suggested that
traits are such categories, because the purpose of trait terms is often to
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indicate whether other people are good for facilitating certain goals
(Buss, 1991; John, 1990). He found that ratings of acts' extremity were
highly predictive of ratings of the acts' prototypicality, providing sup
port for the idea that act prototypicality is reflective not of similarity,
but of approximation to an ideal (see also Read et al., 1990). However,
neither Borkenau (1990) nor Read et al. obtained direct pairwise ratings
of acts' similarity to each other, so extremity has not been pitted against
the direct measure of similarity used in natural-object research (e.g.,
Rosch, 1978). In the present research, we obtained direct pairwise
ratings of act similarity.
Hypothesis 3 begins our concern with the influence of trait categories
on person perception. Our basic assumption is that the mental organiza
tion of trait categories ought to influence perceptions of others. That is,
the way people represent behavior-trait relations ought to influence how
they interpret others' behaviors in terms of traits. However, there is little
theoretical work on how this might occur, in part because there is little
work on the organization of acts into traits. We generated hypotheses by
drawing analogies to Osherson et al. (1990; see also Rips, 1975). These
analogized hypotheses, not the Osherson et al. model, are tested in this
report.
This report concerns two kinds of person perception. The first kind is
when perceivers use a trait term as an abstract but compact description
of a set of an actor's observed behaviors (Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Park,
1989; Park, DeKay, & Kraus, 1994). These are the cases in which perceiv
ers observe a small number of acts an actor has done, and go to a higher
(trait) level in the trait hierarchy for a more-or-less apt description of
what the actor did. For example:
F. Observed: Slammed the door when he left the room
is what he did.
Accused them of talking about him behind
his back is what he did.
Argued over presidential candidates is
what he did.
Conclusion: Acting quarrelsome is what he did.
The predicate "is what he did" means that (i) something was done (an
act or acts), (ii) the something was done by the indicated actor, and (iii)
the something falls into the predicated category. Note the similarity to
the general arguments described by Osherson and colleagues (1990):
perceivers observe that given subordinate categories (here, "slammed
door", "accused them", "argued") are described by a certain predicate
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(here, "is what he did"), and conclude with more or less confidence
that the superordinate category (here, "quarrelsome") has the same
predicate ("is what he did").
Hypotheses 3 and 4 explore the influence of the representativeness of
observed subordinate act categories on perceivers' confidence in using
superordinate trait categories to describe those acts. As multiple-stage
models of person perception are making increasingly clear, this is an
important and non-trivial step in person perception (Bassili, 1989; Gil
bert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Higgins, Strauman, & Klein, 1986; Reeder &
Brewer, 1979; Trope, 1986; Wyer & Srull, 1986). A given behavior often
can be described by multiple traits (e.g., is "slammed the door when he
left the room" quarrelsome, careless, or exuberant?) or might best be
described without a trait term at all. Furthermore, identifying a behavior
with a trait term might have important consequences for later causal
attributions or predictions of the actor's behavior (as explored in Study
3). In this way, the problem we are investigating is similar to the early
(behavioral identification) stages in multiple-stage models of person
perception. However, one important difference is that our perceivers are
describing a set of acts, not individual acts. This will be discussed further
in the discussion.
Hypothesis 3 was that the more prototypical the observed acts, the
stronger the argument. That is, the more each of the observed acts are
representative of the trait category, the more confidence perceivers will
have that the trait is a good general description of the acts. We are aware
of no direct challenge to this hypothesis, and in fact Borkenau (1990) has
provided evidence supporting it. Hypothesis 4 was that argument
strength will increase with dissimilarity among the observed acts. This
hypothesis is based on the hypothesis that representativeness is deter
mined by the similarity of the observed categories to the other categories
in the same superordinate category (Hypothesis 2). Holding prototypi
cality constant, the more dissimilar the observed acts are to each other,
the larger the total number of the other acts in the trait to which they will
be similar, and so the more representative they will be of the trait. Thus,
dissimilarity should increase representativeness for the trait and thereby
aptness of the trait as a description of the acts. We are aware of no direct
challenges to this hypothesis, but challenges to Hypothesis 2 stand as
indirect challenges to Hypothesis 4.
The fifth and final hypothesis concerns another kind of person percep
tion, in which trait-description of observed acts has consequences for
predictions of unobserved acts. Oftentimes perceivers judge the likeli
hood that a specific person has performed a specific act (e.g., Is it possible
that Tom picked a fight with a stranger?). We propose that the prototypi-
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cality of acts that the actor is observed to have performed will be relevant
to such judgments, and consider whether prototypicality of the unob
served act will also be relevant. For example:
G. Observed: Slammed the door when he left the room is
what he did.
Conclusion: Picked a fight with a stranger is what he did.
Such arguments are analogous to the "specific" arguments in the Osh
erson et al. (1990) model: the predicate ("is what he did") is generalized
from one subordinate category ("slammed the door . . . ") to another
subordinate category ("picked a fight. . . . ") at the same level and
included in the same superordinate (quarrelsomeness).
Hypothesis 3 was that prototypicality of observed acts increases argu
ment strength, and we tested it also in these cases. Because the trait term
is not explicitly mentioned, however, Hypothesis 3 might not extend to
such cases. Hypothesis 5 was that the prototypicality of the conclusion
act would be irrelevant to the judged likelihood of that act. This hypothe
sis seems less intuitive, for at least two reasons. First, more prototypical
acts may be more or less frequent than less prototypical acts, and so
prototypicality of a conclusion act should influence its judged likelihood
(Read et al., 1990). The second challenge is based on the assertion that
prototypicality represents facility at achieving goals, as described above
(Barsalou, 1985; Borkenau, 1990). Thus, an actor who has performed a
moderately prototypical act has shown only a moderate facility at
achieving a goal, leaving it an open questionwhether the actor is capable
of performing highly prototypical acts. Thus, performing a moderately
prototypical actmight increase the perceived likelihood of other moder
ately or low prototypical acts, but not increase the likelihood of high
prototypical acts. More generally, an observed act might increase the
judged likelihood of equal or less prototypical acts, but not the likelihood
of more prototypical acts, resulting in an interaction between observed
act prototypicality and conclusion act prototypicality (Buss & Craik,
1983).
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
The present research tested the five hypotheses summarized
in Table 1.
In Study 1, subjects rated the prototypicality, extremity, and pairwise
similarity, of 200 acts. Study 1 addressed the first two hypotheses: (i)
whether an act's membership in a category is a continuous variable (i.e.,
does prototypicality organize act categories into trait categories?); and
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(ii) whether an act's prototypicality is determined by its extremity or by
its average similarity to other acts in the same trait. In Study 2, subjects
used trait terms to describe actors' behaviors that varied in their proto
typicality and intra-description similarity, providing evidence relevant
to Hypotheses 3 and 4. Specifically, does argument strength increase
with the prototypicality and/or with the dissimilarity of observed be
haviors? In Study 3, subjects indicated how likely an unobserved act was
to occur on the basis of an observed act. Both the unobserved and
observed behaviors varied in prototypicality. Thus, this study tested
Hypothesis 5, which is that an act's prototypicality is irrelevant to its




Subjects. Twenty subjects completed the materials in 2, 1-hour, indi
vidual sessions as partial course credit for an introductory-level psychol
ogy course at a large midwestern university. One subject's data were
unavailable because of computer problems.
Materials and Procedure. Acts were taken from four of the traits in the
Buss and Craik (1983) act lists (dominance, submissiveness, quarrel
someness, and agreeableness). Buss and Craik obtained these lists
through an act-nomination procedure. Subjects were asked to think of
someone who could be described by a given trait, and to list five acts
the person had performed. The nominated acts were narrowed down
to 100, which represented a range of prototypicalities for each trait. For
example, "He slammed the door when he left the room" is highly
prototypical of quarrelsomeness, whereas "He accused them of talking
about him behind his back" is moderately prototypical, and "He argued
about the presidential candidates" is not very prototypical of quarrel
someness. Although 100 acts per trait were available, getting similarity
ratings on all 4950 pairs of acts would have been too great of a burden
for the subjects. We therefore selected 50 acts from each trait, by taking
the first and every other act from Buss and Craik's list. Additionally, as
prototypicality ratings varied with gender of the target (Buss & Craik,
1983), we stayed within one arbitrarily chosen gender, and all acts were
worded with males as the targets.
Each subject completed the materials for one trait, rating the similarity
of each act to a random selection of 25 of the remaining 49 acts, for a total
TRAIT CATEGORIES 377
of 625 pairwise similarity ratings. The selection of pairs, the order of the
presentation of the pairs, and of the order of the acts within a pair, were
randomly determined for each subject.
Similarity ratings were made on an IBM personal computer. After the
subject read the instructions, the computer presented two acts, in the
middle-upper part of the screen, and just below them a 9-point scale
(from "not at all similar" to "very similar"). After the subject indicated
how similar the two acts were by pressing a number from 1 to 9, the
computer presented the next pair of acts. After every 100 ratings, the
computer enforced a minimum 20-second pause.
Each subject's estimate of the average pairwise similarity (APS) of an act
to the other acts in the trait was computed as themean across that subject's
ratings of the 25 pairs in which the act occurred. Because subjects differed
in the means of their similarity ratings (e.g., some subjects used the high
end of the scale and others used the low end), each subject's ratings were
standardized, before performing analyses, to a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1 (the results were similar on the unstandardized data).
Additionally, one subject rating similarity of dominance behaviors and one
rating similarity of quarrelsomeness behaviors had low item-total correla
tions (below .20), and were excluded from all analyses.
PROTOTYPICALITY AND EXTREMITY RATINGS
Subjects and Procedure. Seventy subjects at a large midwestern univer
sity completed the materials in classrooms at the conclusion of class-
time, in small groups, and were offered five dollars as compensation for
their time. In order to be sure that extremity and prototypicality ratings
did not contaminate each other, subjects were randomly assigned to
rating task and to order by distribution of questionnaires.
Materials. The same 200 acts rated for similarity were used (50 acts for
each of 4 traits). The first page of the questionnaire described the study,
and the second page listed four examples for a trait not used in the study.
The 200 acts were listed on the following pages, 11 to 13 per page. Acts
from a trait were always listed together, and the trait name appeared on
the top of the page. In the prototypicality rating task, subjects rated on a
7-point scale how good an example the act is of the trait (following Rosch
& Mervis, 1975, and Buss & Craik, 1983), from a "poor example of T" to
a "very good example of T" (with T referring to the trait being rated). In
the extremity rating task, subjects rated how extreme the act is, also on
2. 50 acts x 25 partners/2 = 625. The total is divided by 2 because each time an act was
a partner was also counted
as one of that act's 25 comparisons, cutting the number of
required comparisons in half.
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TABLE 2. Inter-Rater Reliabilities of Prototypicality, Extremity, and





N of Raters 34 36 4 or 5 per trait
Dominance .94 .92 .73
Submissiveness .95 .94 .80
Quarrelsomeness .96a .94a .75
Agreeableness .88 .85 .86
Note. Table entries are Cronbach's Alphas computed with raters in the columns and behaviors in the
rows. Each trait had 50 behaviors, and the alpha describes the consistency across raters in the rank
ordering of the 50 behaviors.
aTwo raters did not complete all of the ratings for the trait of quarrelsomeness, so those alphas are based
on 33 and 35 raters.
a 7-point scale, from "not at all extreme T" to "very extreme T". Within




Subjects demonstrated satisfactory agreement on each of the three rat
ings of acts. Table 2 shows the reliabilities for each of the traits for each
of the three ratings. All of the reliabilities (Cronbach's Alphas) were
above .84 for prototypicality and extremity ratings, with most in the
mid-90's. The APS reliabilities, although lower, were also quite good.
The inter-rater reliability of the prototypicality ratings suggests that it
was meaningful to subjects to rate prototypicality, and that subjects
agreed in the task's meaning. Additional evidence concerning Hypothe
sis 1, that prototypicality is a continuous variable, was obtained by
examining the distributions of prototypicality ratings for unimodality.
No value in the original metric of the scales had an act frequency that
was lower than values on both sides of it, with one exception (there were
11 quarrelsome acts with a prototypicality between 2 and 2.99, 10 with
a prototypicality between 3 and 3.99, and 17 between 4 and 4.99). This
lack of "gaps" in the distributions argues against the possibility that acts
either were or were not a good member of their trait category. We also
investigated distributions at the individual subject level. A gap was
defined as a value on the prototypicality scale that had a frequency that
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Dominance .77** .64** .48**
Submissiveness .91" .77** .73**
Quarrelsomeness .77** .59** .30*
Agreeableness .58** .28 .63**
Note. Table entries are correlations between the two variables listed at the head of the column, across
the 50 acts within the trait listed on the left.
*p<.05, **p< .01.
was at most one-half of the frequency of at least one value higher than
itself and of at least one value lower than itself. For dominance, submis
siveness, quarrelsomeness, and agreeableness, 13, 14, 16, and 14 subjects,
respectively, showed at least one such gap. Thus, about 58% of the
within-subject distributions were relatively unimodal as well.
DIMENSION INTERRELATIONS
Each act received one prototypicality, one extremity, and one average
pairwise similarity (APS) score by averaging over the prototypicality,
extremity, and APS ratings, respectively, obtained from the raters. The
following analyses are based on these scores, with act as the unit of
analysis (thus, n
= 50 per trait). Before examining the results in the
present data, it bears mentioning that the present prototypicality ratings
correlated highly with the ratings Buss and Craik (1983) reported (Domi
nance: r (50) = .75; Submissiveness: r (50)
= .88; Quarrelsomeness: r (50)
= .59; Agreeableness: r (50)
= .54). This provides converging evidence of
a high level of agreement across subjects.
Table 3 shows that all three ratings were highly intercorrelated.With the
exception of agreeableness, prototypicality
was highly correlated with
both APS and extremity. However, because APS and extremity were also
highly correlated, it is hard
to decipher their relative importance in deter
mining prototypicality. Table
4 shows the results of multiple regressions
predicting prototypicality simultaneously
from extremity and APS,
thereby describing the relationships
of extremity and APS to prototypical
ity while controlling for each
other. Both extremity and APS had unique
relationships to prototypicality, although extremity's relationship
was
often substantially stronger. Note also that between 73-85%
of the variance
in prototypicality (R2) was explained by these two dimensions together.
Agreeableness was somewhat
of an exception, in that prototypicality was
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TABLE 4. Regressions Predicting Prototypicality from Extremity and
Average Pairwise Similarity (APS)
Prototypicality for
Trait of Extremity (J Similarity fj
Explained Variance
in Prototypicality
Dominance .61** .35** .69**
Submissiveness .75** .22* .85**
Quarrelsomeness .65** .40** .73**
Agreeableness 67** -.15 .35**
Note. This table shows the results of four separate multiple regressions, one for each trait, with each one
predicting the prototypicality of an act for a trait simultaneously from the act's extremity and its average
similarity to other acts in the trait. The first two columns show standardized partial betas, and the third
column shows the percentage of variance explained (R ). There were 50 acts in each trait.
*p < .05; **p < .01
not predicted as strongly, and not at all by APS. Perhaps the anomalous
results for agreeablenesswere due to the relatively low amount of variance
in the agreeableness prototypicality ratings, a fact also noted by Buss and
Craik. As a check that these results were not due to the lower inter-rater
reliability of the APS ratings, we computed disattenuated bivariate corre
lations (with inter-rater reliabilities as estimates of error). For all four traits,
the extremity-prototypicality correlation remained stronger than the APS-
prototypicality correlation, although the differences between the correla
tions were smaller.
DISCUSSION
Study 1 revealed rater consensus about the prototypicality, extremity,
and average intra-trait similarity of behaviors, suggesting that mental
representations of trait categories are shared. The first hypothesis was
supported, in that an act's degree of membership in a trait category can
be characterized as continuous. Secondly, the multiple regressions
showed that nearly all of the reliable variance in prototypicality ratings
was explained by the two variables of extremity and APS, in three of four
traits, suggesting that degree of category membership of an act depends
on its extremity and on its similarity to other acts in the same trait.
Contrary to the second hypothesis, extremity was always the predomi
nant predictor. On the other hand, APS did explain uniquely a sizeable
proportion of variance in prototypicality (note also that this was despite
the fact that similarity and prototypicality ratings shared almost no
method variance). Thus, these results replicated Borkenau (1990) and
Read and colleagues (1990); importantly they replicated also with direct
pairwise similarity ratings, which neither of the previous studies as
sessed. In sum, neither the extreme version of the extremity position nor
the extreme version of the similarity position is tenable.
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STUDY 2
Study 1 showed that acts differ in their degree of membership in trait
categories, or in their prototypicality, and that an act's degree of mem
bership is largely determined by its extremity and its average similarity
to other acts in the trait. Study 2 turned to the effects such a category
structure has on person perception. Specifically, Study 2 investigated the
third hypothesis (whether the prototypicality of observed acts enhances
argument strength), and the fourth hypothesis (whether dissimilarity
among multiple observed acts enhances argument strength). Subjects
read descriptions of targets' acts and indicated the aptness of the trait
term as a general description. Hypothesis 3 was addressed by varying
the prototypicality of the observed acts, and Hypothesis 4 was addressed
by varying the intra-description similarity of the observed acts.
METHOD
SUBJECTS AND PROCEDURE
Thirty-eight subjects completed the experiment in small groups, as
partial credit toward an introductory-level psychology course. After
arriving at the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to condi
tion, read the written instructions, and completed the materials. After
finishing, subjects read written feedback.
MATERIALS AND DESIGN
In the interest of sensitivity, we employed a choice methodology. Sub
jects read descriptions of two person's behavior, and chose which was a
better example of the trait. Each description consisted of three acts from
the same trait, performed by the same person. For example: Who is a
better example of Quarrelsomeness?
Description 1:
Frank tried to avoid responsibility for an accident.
Another time, Frank exaggerated his personal problems.
Also, Frank changed his mind several times about where he
wanted to eat.
Description 2:
Evan told his friend not to buy the car.
Another time, Evan criticized someone for smoking.
Also, Evan chastised a friend for not putting his napkin in
his lap.
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In order to consider whether the prototypicality of the observed acts
increases aptness of the trait term, the acts in one description were more
prototypical than in the other description. To minimize the influence of
similarity of the acts within a description ("intra-description similarity",
IDS), IDS was equal in the two descriptions. In one item-type, IDS was
low in both descriptions, in a second item-type IDS was high in both
descriptions. Thus, two item-types contrasted high prototypical acts
against low prototypical acts.
The other hypothesis was that low IDS would increase argument
strength, and two more item-types were designed to test this hypothesis.
In these items, one description consisted of acts highly similar to each
other (high IDS), and the other description consisted of acts not similar
to each other (low IDS). To minimize the effects of prototypicality, in one
of these item-types, both descriptions had low prototypical acts, and in
the other item-type, both descriptions had high prototypical acts.
Thus, there were four types of items, and each item-type appeared
once for each trait, for a total of 16 items (there were two additional
item-types that were not relevant to the present hypotheses and will not
be described).
Act Selection. Acts and prototypicality ratings were taken from the Buss
and Craik (1983) list of acts for the four traits of aloofness, quarrelsome
ness, agreeableness, and gregariousness. As prototypicality ratings var
ied with gender of the target (Buss & Craik, 1983), we stayed within one
arbitrarily chosen gender, and all acts were worded with males as the
targets. Of the 100 acts available for each trait, 24 were needed to create
4 choices, each with 2 descriptions and 3 acts in each description. Given
that no act appeared twice, the pool of available acts was strained to meet
the demands imposed by the design, and we were forced to be somewhat
flexible in our description creation. (Study 1 provided ratings on only 50
acts, which would not have been enough to create the materials; recall
that there was high agreement between the prototypicality ratings we
observed and those Buss and Craik [1983] reported.)
Description Creation. Each description consisted of three acts. High
prototypical descriptions had average prototypicalities above the mean
prototypicality for the trait; low prototypical descriptions had average
prototypicalities below the mean prototypicality for the trait. In items
which contrasted prototypicality, the difference between the average
prototypicalities of the two descriptions was as large as possible. Given
the differences in means and variances, across traits, of prototypicality
3. Although this method gains the sensitivity of a choice methodology, it loses the
simplicity of a 2 x 2 ANOVA design. This is because each item (and thus each response)
referred to two cells of the 2x2 table, not just one, which is required for an ANOVA model.
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ratings (Buss & Craik, 1983), these differences varied with the trait. For
agreeableness, the two differences in prototypicality ratings were 1.16
and 1.43; for aloofness, 1.28 and 1.78; for gregariousness, 1.28 and 1.59;
and for quarrelsomeness, the differentials were 2.97 and 3.05. In items
holding prototypicality constant across descriptions, the difference be
tween the average prototypicalities of the two descriptions was as small
as possible. In seven of the eight items, the prototypicality differential
was less than .13. In one of the quarrelsomeness items, we were unable
to keep the differential below .85.
When intra-description similarity was high, the three acts were chosen
to be similar to each other; when intra-description similarity was low, the
acts were chosen so that none were similar to each other. In order to
guarantee that acts were not similar to each other for superficial reasons,
when two acts in the same description shared a major word, the word was
changed to a synonym in one of the two acts (e.g., "alone" was changed to
"by himself"; "club" was changed to "team"), in 9 of the 144 acts.
In order to insure that it was clear to subjects that the same target
performed all three acts in a description, the first line of each description
listed an arbitrarily selected name and a couple of irrelevant pieces of
information (e.g., "Robert is 26, lives in a moderate climate, and reads
the newspaper."). The next line listed the first performed act. The second
act followed on the next line, preceded by the words, "Another time,".
The third act followed on the next line, preceded by the word, "Also,".
The target's name was repeated within each act.
For half of the subjects, printed below the two descriptions was the
question: "Who is more T?" (T was replaced with the trait label), and the
two names of the targets. However, we also added a judgment task that
wasmore focused on the descriptive function of trait terms, so as to avoid
possible causal inferences: The other half of the subjects answered "Who
is a better example of a T person?" Assignment to this variable ("judg
ment task") was randomly determined by questionnaire distribution.
We predicted no effects of judgment task.
Questionnaire Layout. For the three traits of Agreeableness, Aloofness,
and Gregariousness, the items were organized systematically: 1. proto
typicality held constant at a high level;
2. IDS held high; 3. IDS held low;
4. prototypicality held low. Within each contrast, the description
with
higher prototypicality or higher intra-description similarity was always
4. As will be discussed later, we assume that subjects treat these judgments as equivalent
to each other and as summary descriptions of the actor's acts. That is, when multiple acts,
performed by the same actor, are observed as part of
an impression-formation task,
referring to the actor is simply a convenient way to summarize
the actor's acts, and is not
an attribution of a causal disposition (e.g., Buss & Craik, 1983; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Park
et al., 1994).
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the first description. In order to make sure that order was not a factor,
quarrelsomeness items were presented in a random order, and within
each item, the order of descriptions was reverse to the other items.
Comparing the quarrelsomeness results with the averages of the results
from the other three traits showed that within-choice description order
did not appear to influence responses.
RESULTS
JUDGMENT TASK
None of the results involving judgment taskwas significant at p < . 10. Thus,
we can conclude that subjects responded in the same way whether they
were choosing the actor that was a better example of the trait or choosing
the actor that was more of the trait. Therefore, in all further analyses, the
data were collapsed over judgment task.
EFFECT OF PROTOTYPICALITY
Hypothesis 3 was that descriptions with higher prototypicality would be
more readily described with the trait term. Two item-types contrasted high
against low prototypical descriptions. As each item-type appeared four
times, a subject could choose the high prototypical description between 0
and 4 times. If prototypicality had no effect on subjects' choices, then the
high prototypical description would be chosen half of the times (2). Thus,
the average number of times the high prototypical description was chosen
was tested against 2, using the t distribution. When IDS was low in both
descriptions, the high prototypical description was chosen an average of
3.2 times, which was significantly greater than 2, t (36) = 8.62, p < .001.
Similarly, when both alternatives had high IDS, high prototypical descrip
tions were chosen 2.8 times, also significantly greater than 2, t (36) = 6.36,
p < .001. In both cases, the more prototypical the observed behaviors, the
more subjects thought that the trait was a good description, supporting
Hypothesis 3. However, a within-subjects f-test revealed that the two
values differed from each other, t (36) = 2.32, p < .05. Thus, the effect of
prototypicality was stronger when behaviors within a description were
not similar to each other.
INTRA-DESCRIPTION SIMILARITY OF ACTS.
Hypothesis 4 was that descriptions with low IDS would be more readily
described by the trait term than would descriptions with high IDS. Two
item-types contrasted low IDS against high IDS descriptions. The aver
age number of times the low IDS description was chosen was tested
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against 2, using the t distribution. When prototypicality was low in both
descriptions, the low IDS description was chosen as reflecting more of
the trait an average of 1.5 times, which was significantly lower than 2, t
(36) = 3.86, p < .001. When both descriptions were highly prototypical,
there was no effect of IDS (M = 2.1), t (36) = .42, ns. A within-subjects
f-test verified that the effect of intra-description similarity depended on
the prototypicality of the behaviors, t (36) = 2.41, p < .05. Thus, Hypothe
sis 4 was not supported: dissimilarity among observed behaviors did not
increase use of the trait term, and in one case, decreased it.
DISCUSSION
Four independent analyses converged in supporting the hypothesis that
argument strength was influenced by the structure of acts in trait cate
gories. Hypothesis 3 was supported: prototypicality of observed behav
iors enhanced the aptness of the trait term as a general description of the
acts. Hypothesis 4 was not supported: intra-description similarity did
not decrease use of the trait term (and in one case, the results were reverse
in direction). Additionally, prototypicality and intra-description similar
ity moderated each other, so that each provided less strength if the other
variable was high. The failures of Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 2 (in
Study 1) make a strong case that, for perceivers, feature similarity of
behaviors is not the primary dimension of behaviors.
Why did intra-description similarity unexpectedly enhance the use of
trait terms? For example:
High Intra-description Similarity:
Steve pledged a fraternity
Another time, Steve joined the country club.
Also, Steve participated on a ski team.
Low Intra-description Similarity:
James arrived late at the meeting because he conversed with
a friend en route.
Another time, James went to a bar.
Also, James was argumentative at a discussion.
Hypothesis 4 was that, because James' three acts exhibited
more kinds of
gregariousness than did
Steve's three acts (only one kind of gregarious
ness), James' behavior would be more representative of gregariousness
than Steve's behavior, and so James would be chosen as a better example
of gregariousness. This hypothesis was
not supported, and in fact, the data
were in the opposite direction. One possible explanation is that, rather
than
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representing diverse aspects of the trait, each of the low similarity acts
remained ambiguous as to whether they represented the trait at all.
For example, is James' "arriving late at the meeting because he con
versed with a friend en route" gregarious or unreliable? When the acts
in a set are dissimilar to each other, such alternative traits remain salient
as descriptions of the acts. In contrast, when the three acts in a set are
similar to each other, the trait-relevant aspects of each act become
highlighted. The "joining" aspect of Steve's acts is highlighted, and
joining is gregarious. That is, the set-as-a-whole is relevant to how
individual acts are described. In the case of dissimilar low prototypical
ity behaviors, alternative descriptions remained salient and the acts
remained ambiguous, lowering perceivers' confidence in the trait term.
STUDY 3
Study 2 showed that the prototypicality of observed behaviors, and their
similarity to each other, influenced the use of trait terms to describe them.
Study 3 turns to another aspect of person perception, in which perceivers
observe one act that an actor has performed, and judge the likelihood of
the actor performing another, unobserved act. By varying the prototypi
cality of the observed behavior, we test Hypothesis 3 in this context as
well. Specifically, Hypothesis 3 predicts that prototypicality of the ob
served act will increase the likelihood of the unobserved act. However,
because the superordinate trait category is not explicitly mentioned in
these cases, the observed act's prototypicality for the trait may not be
relevant, predicting no effect of the observed act's prototypicality.
Hypothesis 5, that the prototypicality of the conclusion (unobserved) act
would be irrelevant to the strength of such arguments, is the main focus
of Study 3. There are at least two challenges to Hypothesis 5. First, there
may be baseline differences in act frequencies, and they may be correlated
with prototypicality. For example, if high prototypical acts are more
frequent than low prototypical acts [as Read et al.'s (1990) subjects be
lieved], then their judged likelihoods should be greater than for low
prototypical acts, which would be evident in a main effect of conclusion
act prototypicality. The second challenge to Hypothesis 5 is based on
reasoning about the nature of prototypicality. Borkenau (1990) argued that
prototypicality might track extremity because extremity indicates how
capable an actor is of achieving certain goals, and this level of capability is
important to perceivers. This suggests that perceivers might be interested
in more than simply whether the actor has any capability at all, but also in
the degree of capability that the actor has. As the prototypicality of the
observed behavior indicates what the actor is at least minimally capable
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of, observed actsmight increase the likelihood of equal or less prototypical
acts, but not affect the likelihood of more prototypical acts. This line of
reasoning would predict an interaction between observed-act prototypi
cality and conclusion-act prototypicality.
METHOD
SUBJECTS AND PROCEDURE
Fifty-three subjects completed the experiment in small groups, as partial
credit towards an introductory-level psychology course at a large mid-
western university. After arriving at the experiment, subjects were ran
domly assigned to condition, read the written instructions, and
completed the materials. After finishing, subjects read written feedback.
DESIGN AND MATERIALS
This study used a rating format, and consisted of a fully factorial 2
(observed act prototypicalities) x 2 (conclusion act prototypicalities) x 2
(item-orders) design. The item-orders factor was between subjects, and
the other two factors were within subjects. The observed act was either
high or low in prototypicality and the conclusion act was either high or
low in prototypicality. Crossing the within-subjects factors created 4
types of descriptions, each appearing 4 times, once for each trait.
Description Creation. Each description consisted of an observed act and
a conclusion (unobserved) act. Because this study required fewer total
acts than Study 2, the acts and prototypicality ratings were drawn from
Study 1 (50 acts in each of the four traits of agreeableness, dominance,
quarrelsomeness, and submissiveness). The acts in Study 1 were split at
the mean of the prototypicality ratings within each trait into high and
low prototypicality acts. Study 2 revealed the ambiguity inherent in
dissimilar acts; given this, all act pairs were similar to each other/ Thus,
all act-pairs were those that had higher than average similarity ratings
in Study 1. Both of the behaviors in a description came
from the same
trait.
It was important to be clear to subjects that the conclusion
act had not
been observed; we considered that future tense would be effective in this
regard. That is, subjects
were instructed to predict how likely it would
be that the actor will perform the second action. Each item was given a
5 Subjects also rated dissimilar act-pairs
in Study 3. However, because the results of
Study 2 indicated that dissimilar
acts are ambiguous, these are not described here.
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FIGURE 1. The effects of observed act prototypicality and conclusion (unobserved) act
prototypicality on the rated likelihood of the unobserved act.
number and an arbitrary name, and presented as in the following exam
ple:
a) Doug did not complain when someone used his carwithout permis
sion.
b) Doug will let a casual acquaintance borrow his record album.
How likely do you think it is that Doug will do the second action?
Subjects responded on a 7-point scale, from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (very
likely). Each description-type appeared four times, once per trait. For
each subject, a score was created for each description-type by taking the
mean across the four times the description-type occurred.
Questionnaire Format. The first page of the questionnaire instructed the
subjects and gave an example. In the trait-order condition, the following
pages listed the descriptions by trait, with the name of the trait written
at the beginning. The items for one trait appeared in random order
within the trait over three pages, and the traits were ordered as follows:
submissiveness, dominance, quarrelsomeness, and agreeableness. In the




In a 2 (observed act prototypicality) x 2 (conclusion act prototypicality)
x 2 (item-order) ANOVA, only the main effect of observed act prototypi
cality was significant, F (1, 51) = 52.87, p < .001. There was no effect for
conclusion act prototypicality, F (1, 51) = 2.07, p > .15, no interaction
between conclusion act and observed act prototypicality, F (1, 51) < 1,
nor a main effect of order, F (1, 51) = 3.15, p < .10 (the trend suggests that
trait-order led to slightly higher ratings in general). Furthermore, all
interactions between order and other effects in the model were not
significant, all F's < 2.53, all p's > .10. As can be seen in Figure 1, the highly
prototypical observed acts led to greater judged likelihood than the low
prototypical observed acts. Thus, at least for similar act pairs, judged
likelihood was enhanced by the prototypicality of the observed behav
ior, andwas unaffected by the prototypicality of the conclusion behavior.
The results supported Hypothesis 3, demonstrating that prototypicality
also had consequences for conclusions about predictions of unobserved
acts. Hypothesis 5 was also supported: the prototypicality of conclusion
acts was not relevant to argument strength.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Starting with Buss and Craik's (1983) joining of family-resemblance and
summary-labels models of traits, and analogizing from research on
natural objects (Osherson et al., 1990; Rips, 1975), we tested five hypothe
ses about the internal structure of trait categories and the influence of
this structure on person perception. We had two goals. First, we wished
to replicate findings that subjects agree on the degree of belongingness
of an act to a category, and to provide evidence about the determinants
of these ratings. Second, we wished to explore some of the effects that
relative belongingness has on conclusions perceivers draw from observ
ing actors' behaviors.
RELATIVE BELONGINGNESS AS A STRUCTURAL FEATURE OF
TRAIT REPRESENTATIONS
We followed several theorists in assuming that there is a hierarchical
structure of personality descriptors (Buss & Craik, 1983; Eysenck, 1947;
Hampson et al., 1986; John
et al., 1991; McCrae & John, 1992; Wiggins,
1979). At the upper levels of this structure are categories
like "ex-
traverted" and "conscientious"; at lower levels are categories of acts.
Two aspects of hierarchies
were particularly relevant to this research
(Hampson et al., 1986).
First was asymmetrical class-inclusion, which is
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that all subordinate categories (e.g., "striking up conversations with
strangers") are included within at least one of the superordinate catego
ries (e.g., "talkativeness"), but that the superordinates are not included
in the subordinates (e.g., "striking up conversations with strangers" is a
way of being "talkative", but being "talkative" is not a way of "striking
up conversations with strangers"). The second relevant aspect of hierar
chies was that categories that differ in level in the hierarchy differ in
breadth (abstractness, generality), that is, in the number of bottom-level
categories they include.
Buss and Craik (1983) extended this model by adding the notion of
prototypicality. That is, some subordinates are better examples of their
superordinates than are other subordinates. Buss and Craik (1983)
showed that subjects agree on how good of an example of a trait a given
act is, as did Borkenau (1990) and Hampson (1982). The results of Study
1 replicated this finding. Furthermore, almost 60% of the subjects
showed no obvious gaps in their ratings, suggesting relatively unimodal
distributions of act prototypicalities
The second hypothesis concerned the determinants of the prototypi
cality of an act. A direct analogy from natural-objects would suggest that
an act's similarity to other acts in the category would determine its
prototypicality. In contrast, the possible role of traits as information
about an individual's capability to achieve certain goals would suggest
that an act's extremity determines its prototypicality (Barsalou, 1985;
Borkenau, 1990). Borkenau (1990) found that extremity was a better
predictor of prototypicality than was central tendency, and Read et al.
(1990) reported that goal facilitation was a better predictor of prototypi
cality than was similarity to the most prototypical acts (although Read
et al. were more concerned with goal-facilitation from the point-of-view
of the actor). In this paper, we compared extremity with similarity
obtained from direct pairwise ratings of acts. The results were consistent
with Borkenau (1990) and Read et al. in that extremity was the stronger
predictor. Nonetheless, similarity had a strong prediction of its own.
Why similarity and extremity both were associated with prototypical
ity is still unclear. First, other variables might be involved. For example,
perceived covariation among acts, either purely associationistic or ty
pological,might be related to both perceived similarity and to prototypi
cality (Anderson & Sedikides, 1991; Sedikides & Anderson, 1994).
Second, we did not constrain perceivers' natural uses of "extremity" by
assuming a particular definition of extremity (e.g., as degree of goal
facilitation), but rather left it simple with the intent to capture the notion
of approximation to the end-point. Whereas this approach netted solid
results (e.g., high inter-rater reliability and strong correlations between
extremity, similarity, and prototypicality), it certainly left ambiguity in
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the meaning of extremity to our subjects. Although extremity probably
means approximation to an end-point, the end-point need not be ideal,
nor need it be ideal for goal facilitation. For example, extremity could
track extremity of desire for a goal, but not the effectiveness of achieving
that goal (e.g., yelling at a superior might be an extreme behavior because
of its expression of a strong desire to be dominant, but actually be very
ineffective at achieving dominance). Alternatively, extremity might be
unrelated to motivational variables, and instead summarize properties
of the behavior itself, such as its effect size (Kelley, 1971) (e.g., extremely
dominant acts make others very unhappy), or even the vigor with which
it is enacted (e.g., commanding is more vigorous than requesting).
Further research is needed to (a) clarify the meaning of extremity, (b)
explain the relationship between extremity and average pairwise simi
larity, and (c) untangle why prototypicality is related to both extremity
and average pairwise similarity.
One challenge to this research enterprise questions our assumption
that traits are organized hierarchically. Gross, Fischer, and Miller (1989)
argued that adjectives (possibly including traits) do not have a hierar
chical structure, but rather a "dumbbell" shape. For example, all traits
are organized into a multi-dimensional space, with each dimension
having one word to express each pole (e.g., "extraverted" and "intro
verted"). All other trait words are simply variants of these words, which
are arranged in (spherical) clouds around such poles. For example
"talkative" is not a subordinate of "extraverted", but rather is a variant
of "extraverted". A central argument for this claim is that it does not
make sense to say that an adjective "is a kind of" another adjective (Gross
et al., 1989). For example, it does not make sense to say that "talkative is
a kind of extraverted". As such class-inclusion relations are central to the
meaning of hierarchies, one cannot use hierarchy-based models to un
derstand traits. However, as Miller and Fellbaum (1991) allowed for
verbs, Hampson et al. (1986) argued that adjectives are describable with
slightly modified class-inclusion statements, specifically, with "is
a way
of being". In a series of experiments (see also John et al., 1991), Hampson
et al. (1986) showed that such class-inclusion statements deliver the
necessary judgment asymmetries. For example, subjects agree
that "to
be talkative is a way of being extraverted", but do not agree that "to be
extraverted is a way of being talkative", suggesting that talkative is a
subordinate category of extraverted. Thus, there is at least
some evidence
to support the assumption
that traits are organized hierarchically.
Aside from this debate, a modified version of the Gross et al. (1989)
model might be consistent with our results. Assuming
that acts are
organized in this multi-dimensional space, that similarity is
determined
by distance in the space,
and that prototypicality equals closeness to the
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poles, our results are not consistent with a spherical distribution of acts,
for then extremity would be unrelated to prototypicality (acts beyond
the pole would have high extremity but low prototypicality). However,
it is possible that the distribution of acts around the poles looks more like
an hourglass than a dumbbell. That is, few acts are more extreme than
the poles, and acts closer to the middle of the dimensions are relatively
closer to the dimensions. Such a model might explain all three inter-cor
relations among prototypicality, extremity, and similarity. Future re
search is needed to address this issue.
EFFECTS OF RELATIVE BELONGINGNESS ON
PERSON PERCEPTION
In this research, we investigated two kinds of person perception. Our
assumptions were that (1) trait categories are represented mentally as a
hierarchy (Buss & Craik, 1983; Eysenck, 1947; Hampson et al., 1986; John
et al., 1991;McCrae & John, 1992; Wiggins, 1979); (2) trait terms are often
applied to people as summary descriptions of their behavior rather than
as enduring causal explanations of behavior (Alston, 1975; Buss & Craik,
1983; Hampshire, 1953; John, 1990; Newman & Uleman, 1993); and (3)
perceivers apply such summary trait labels with more or less confidence,
but rarely with certitude (Park, 1989; Park et al., 1994). Our general
proposal was that the hierarchical trait structure would influence per
ceivers' conclusions about actors' behaviors.
The first kind of person perception we examined was the conclusion
that a trait is a good summary label of an actor's observed behavior. We
conceived of such conclusions as the use of a higher-level category in the
trait hierarchy to describe what an actor did. Results supported Hy
pothesis 3, in that the more prototypical (representative) the observed
actswere of their superordinate trait, themore confidence perceivers had
in using the trait to summarize the acts. Hypothesis 4 was not supported,
in that dissimilarity among the observed behaviors did not increase this
confidence. Together with the limited support for Hypothesis 2, it is
probable that representativeness of an act (or of an act set) for a trait is
not determined primarily by similarity.
Person-perception is increasingly being described by (at least) two-
stage models (Bassili, 1989; Gilbert et al., 1988; Higgins et al., 1986;
Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Trope, 1986; Wyer & Srull, 1986). In the first
stage, perceivers describe an observed act with a trait term, and in the
second stage, perceivers attribute a causal disposition to the actor. This
distinction between the two stages is close to the distinction between
using a trait term to refer to an act (Stage 1) and using the trait term to
refer to an actor (Stage 2), as can be seen most clearly in the case of single
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observed acts. For example, it is easy to imagine thinking that a given
act is rude without thinking that the actor is generally rude. This distinc
tion is important for at least two reasons. On the one hand, situational
information has been shown to have very different effects on attributions
of causality than on descriptions of acts. On the other hand, it is rarely
obvious which trait term (if any at all) is a good description of an act, but
such descriptions can have consequences for further interpretations or
predictions about the actor (as explored in Study 3). The goal of Study 2
was to contribute to the understanding of such behavioral descriptions.
However, when perceivers use a single trait term to describe a set of
multiple observed acts, referring to the actor may not be part of the
second stage (i.e., may not involve an attribution of a causal disposition).
Rather, referring to the actor with the trait term may simply be an
efficient way to represent the description ofmultiple acts (e.g., Hastie &
Kumar, 1979; Park, 1986; Park et al., 1994). In fact, this is the central claim
of summary-labels models of traits: saying an actor has a trait only
describes a set of the actor's acts and does not attribute a causal disposi
tion to the actor (e.g., Buss & Craik, 1983). Newman and Uleman (1993)
pointed this out when arguing that "trait-related terms can be used in at
least five ways: (a) to describe a particular behavior, (b) to describe a
person at a particular time, (c) to describe behaviors that a person does
frequently, (d) to describe a person over time, and (e) to describe a
dispositional cause." (p. 515). The (c) and (d) senses refer to the actor, but
only as a way of describing the actor's acts, not as a causal disposition
(e). Future research is needed to clarify (1) where summary-labels uses
of trait terms fit into multiple-stage models, (2) the extent to which
descriptions of sets of behaviors refer to actors, and (3) the effects of
trait-category mental representations on the other three uses of trait
terms. The focus of our work was rather on demonstrating the effects of
prototypicality of observed acts on the use of trait terms as descriptive
summary labels.
Hypothesis 5 concerned another aspect of person-perception. In these
cases, perceivers judge the likelihood that an actor performed an act on
the basis of observing other actions of the actor. The results extended the
confirmation of Hypothesis 3 to such cases, and also supported Hy
pothesis 5. Specifically, the surprising result Rips (1975) reported was
extended to person perception: prototypicality of a conclusion act was
not relevant to its judged likelihood. We find the lack of an interaction
between observed-act and conclusion-act prototypicality particularly
surprising. This result means that perceivers did not distinguish be
tween people in which acts of a trait were expected of them, only in
whether acts in a trait were expected of them. Some researchers have
argued that one purpose
of trait categories is to keep track of who is
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capable of achieving certain socially-valued goals, and that more proto
typical acts are better for achieving those goals. Thus, we might expect
that perceivers would distinguish people who are best able to achieve
the goals (perform highly prototypical acts) from those who are also
capable, but only moderately so (perform moderately or low prototypi
cal acts). For example, a highly skilled runner is not expected to run more
often, but rather to run faster when running. In the trait domain, it
appears that perceivers distinguish between actors only in their relative
frequency or likelihood of performing skill-relevant acts, not in how
effective or capable those acts are. More generally, and independently of
whether prototypicality represents skill, perceiversmight be expected to
track the quality of the acts expected of actors. For example, highly
dominant people seem to perform dominant acts not only more often,
but also dominant acts that are more "intensely" dominant (e.g., McCrae
& Costa, 1990, p. 23). However, the present results suggest that within-
trait dimensional thinking about the expected behaviors of actors is
limited to frequency, and does not include level of prototypicality of acts.
One final and related issue worth considering is the role of the predi
cate in person-perception arguments. Because we were interested in the
summary-labels usage of trait terms, we used "is what P did" as our
predicate. In addition, this was a "blank predicate" (i.e., subjects did not
know anything about the actors except their acts), so that we could focus
on the role of categories in such arguments. However, if interest were in
individuals' reasoning about behaviors, a different predicate could be
used, as noted by one reviewer. For example, the predicate "is performed
by people who experienced quintic childhoods" would be useful in
understanding how subjects make inferences about associates of behav
iors. The Osherson and colleagues (1990) model would suggest interest
ing hypotheses about such inferences as well, and future research could
explore whether similar results to those found in the present research
obtain.
In sum, part of the interest in mental representations of traits arises in
their implications both for the "how" and for the "what" of person-per
ception (Trope & Higgins, 1993). The data indicated that person percep
tion processes draw on stored, structured knowledge about traits. In
contrast to characterizations of perceivers as rather broad-banded cate-
gorizers, who pay attention only to the mere membership of a behavior
in one trait or another, this research showed that perceivers can be
relatively sophisticated in the fine distinctions they make between be
haviors. From a perceiver's point of view, behaviors carry information
about their degree of membership in a category, their degree of extrem
ity, and their similarity to other members of the trait, and this informa
tion has consequences for the conclusions perceivers draw. A full
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account of any person-perception calculus would include the operations
performed on this information.
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